My name is Samuel A. Taylor. I received my PhD in August of 2013 and came to teach at Auburn in 2015. Before coming to Auburn, I taught at both the University of Iowa and the University of Minnesota - Duluth. Throughout my courses I treat the study of philosophy within the university not just as a means to developing important career skills (which it does) but also, just as importantly, critical to one's own development as a person. Please visit my teaching pages to learn more about my approach to teaching.
My research focuses on issues in epistemology and the philosophy of mind. Much of my work investigates the roles that consciousness and attention play in a proper account of epistemic rationality. I argue that attention mechanisms that have been well studied in the cognitive sciences can help to "demystify" the traditional notion of acquaintance. Moreover, I argue that this relation plays a critical role in explaining what it is for a subject to have evidence. I also argue that an internalism that appeals to such acquaintance enjoys theoretical benefits such as avoiding the problem of easy justification without falling into the opposite problem of making justification unrealistically demanding. Recently, I have also started working on issues related to epistemic agency. I hold that the value of justification and knowledge needs to be understood in terms of a kind of "achievement normativity" as many virtue epistemologists have suggested. However, on my view, knowledge can only be considered an achievement when our grasp of a truth is a manifestation of our own epistemic agency, and we can only do justice to the relevant notion of truth via one's own agency by accepting internalist requirements.
Outside of philosophy I have a variety of interests including an obsession with board games -- honestly, I probably own (and play) more board games than many people even know exist. I also love simply spending time doing anything with my wife, Hannah, and our amazing (almost) 2-year old daughter Nora.
My research focuses on issues in epistemology and the philosophy of mind. Much of my work investigates the roles that consciousness and attention play in a proper account of epistemic rationality. I argue that attention mechanisms that have been well studied in the cognitive sciences can help to "demystify" the traditional notion of acquaintance. Moreover, I argue that this relation plays a critical role in explaining what it is for a subject to have evidence. I also argue that an internalism that appeals to such acquaintance enjoys theoretical benefits such as avoiding the problem of easy justification without falling into the opposite problem of making justification unrealistically demanding. Recently, I have also started working on issues related to epistemic agency. I hold that the value of justification and knowledge needs to be understood in terms of a kind of "achievement normativity" as many virtue epistemologists have suggested. However, on my view, knowledge can only be considered an achievement when our grasp of a truth is a manifestation of our own epistemic agency, and we can only do justice to the relevant notion of truth via one's own agency by accepting internalist requirements.
Outside of philosophy I have a variety of interests including an obsession with board games -- honestly, I probably own (and play) more board games than many people even know exist. I also love simply spending time doing anything with my wife, Hannah, and our amazing (almost) 2-year old daughter Nora.
