The Problem of Easy Justification: An Investigation of Evidence, Justification, and Reliability
Dissertation Summary
Can a belief source such as perception or memory provide justification absent any prior reason to believe that it’s reliable? This question is at the center of a puzzle in contemporary epistemology. A negative answer invites a vicious regress and global skepticism. A positive answer, however, appears to allow one to justify the reliability of a source by using an intuitively problematic form of reasoning known as epistemic bootstrapping. What are we to do?
In my dissertation I begin by developing this puzzle in more detail (in chapter 2) and arguing against a variety of contemporary responses (in chapter 3). I then go on to resolve this puzzle by developing and defending an evidentialist theory of justification founded on the traditional notion of direct acquaintance. According to evidentialism, the justification of any doxastic attitude holds in virtue of a subject’s possession of evidence and what this evidence supports. This, however, is a mere sketch of a theory until we are given detailed accounts of evidence, evidence possession, and evidential support.
Regarding the ontology of evidence, I argue (in chapter 4) that evidence always consists of facts (i.e. truth-makers) rather than propositions (i.e. truth-bearers). These facts constitute evidence in virtue of standing in confirmation relations to propositions that are isomorphic to the confirmation relations that hold between pairs of propositions.
I go on to argue (in chapter 5) that in order for a subject S to possess some evidence E for a proposition P in the sense relevant to justification S must meet two conditions: (i) S must be aware of E and (ii) S must grasp the evidential connection between E and P. Developing these conditions further could result in either an internalist or externalist theory depending on how one understands evidential support and the required grasping of this relation. Internalists can explain such a grasp by appealing to a kind of 1st-person awareness of E’s relevance to P. Externalists, however, can also accommodate the insight in various ways. John Greco, for instance, has attempted to accommodate the insight in terms of a subject’s having a stable disposition to reason in accordance with the norm “if E then believe P” when thinking conscientiously. An alternative externalist account might require that a reliable process that has some evidence E as input and a belief that P as output has been selected for by evolution because of its reliability—as opposed to some other feature of the process.
Despite admitting that externalist theories can and should require a grasp of evidential support, I argue (in chapter 6) that the evidential relation itself is better understood in an internalist fashion. I use the new evil demon thought experiment to argue that: (i) evidential support is a probabilistic relation; (ii) evidential support is an internal relation (i.e. one that holds solely in virtue of the nature of its relata) and not an external relation such as reliability or proper function; and (iii) evidential support relations can be known to hold a priori.
In chapter 7 I appeal to these insights into the evidential concepts in order to develop a full theory of epistemic justification. I argue that, in order to avoid Sellarsian worries, we must understand the awareness of evidence and a subject’s grasp of evidential support in terms of a non-conceptual form of awareness or acquaintance. A subject S will be justified in believing a proposition P (absent defeaters) iff S is acquainted with a set of facts F that makes probable P and either directly or indirectly aware of the probability relation (the former results in foundational justification and the later result in inferential justification). My view is heavily inspired by the epistemology of Richard Fumerton. However, my version of the theory—as opposed to Fumerton’s—makes room for the possibility of fallible (non-introspective) foundations and the possibility of inferential justification absent higher-order beliefs about evidential connections. These features put me in a unique position to avoid a variety of objections and worries associated with Fumerton’s more demanding theory.
In my 8th and final chapter I show how my developed theory avoids easy justification without falling into global skepticism. On my account, a subject S only possesses perceptual evidence for beliefs about the physical world if S “grasps” its relevance to these beliefs. This “grasp”, however, is a non-conceptual form of awareness (i.e. direct acquaintance) which is weaker than justified belief. This allows me to avoid the skeptical regress. Moreover, I argue that the “grasp” of the relevance of one’s perceptual evidence just is to be aware of an a priori reason for believing that one’s perceptual evidence is reliable. This, thereby, allows us to avoid the illegitimate gains in justification involved in easy justification. Given how grim the prospects are for resolving our puzzle by other means (the upshot of my third chapter), my theory’s ability to resolve our puzzle gives reason to think that epistemic theories founded on a traditional notion of direct acquaintance should be given more serious consideration than they have been given by contemporary epistemologists.
In my dissertation I begin by developing this puzzle in more detail (in chapter 2) and arguing against a variety of contemporary responses (in chapter 3). I then go on to resolve this puzzle by developing and defending an evidentialist theory of justification founded on the traditional notion of direct acquaintance. According to evidentialism, the justification of any doxastic attitude holds in virtue of a subject’s possession of evidence and what this evidence supports. This, however, is a mere sketch of a theory until we are given detailed accounts of evidence, evidence possession, and evidential support.
Regarding the ontology of evidence, I argue (in chapter 4) that evidence always consists of facts (i.e. truth-makers) rather than propositions (i.e. truth-bearers). These facts constitute evidence in virtue of standing in confirmation relations to propositions that are isomorphic to the confirmation relations that hold between pairs of propositions.
I go on to argue (in chapter 5) that in order for a subject S to possess some evidence E for a proposition P in the sense relevant to justification S must meet two conditions: (i) S must be aware of E and (ii) S must grasp the evidential connection between E and P. Developing these conditions further could result in either an internalist or externalist theory depending on how one understands evidential support and the required grasping of this relation. Internalists can explain such a grasp by appealing to a kind of 1st-person awareness of E’s relevance to P. Externalists, however, can also accommodate the insight in various ways. John Greco, for instance, has attempted to accommodate the insight in terms of a subject’s having a stable disposition to reason in accordance with the norm “if E then believe P” when thinking conscientiously. An alternative externalist account might require that a reliable process that has some evidence E as input and a belief that P as output has been selected for by evolution because of its reliability—as opposed to some other feature of the process.
Despite admitting that externalist theories can and should require a grasp of evidential support, I argue (in chapter 6) that the evidential relation itself is better understood in an internalist fashion. I use the new evil demon thought experiment to argue that: (i) evidential support is a probabilistic relation; (ii) evidential support is an internal relation (i.e. one that holds solely in virtue of the nature of its relata) and not an external relation such as reliability or proper function; and (iii) evidential support relations can be known to hold a priori.
In chapter 7 I appeal to these insights into the evidential concepts in order to develop a full theory of epistemic justification. I argue that, in order to avoid Sellarsian worries, we must understand the awareness of evidence and a subject’s grasp of evidential support in terms of a non-conceptual form of awareness or acquaintance. A subject S will be justified in believing a proposition P (absent defeaters) iff S is acquainted with a set of facts F that makes probable P and either directly or indirectly aware of the probability relation (the former results in foundational justification and the later result in inferential justification). My view is heavily inspired by the epistemology of Richard Fumerton. However, my version of the theory—as opposed to Fumerton’s—makes room for the possibility of fallible (non-introspective) foundations and the possibility of inferential justification absent higher-order beliefs about evidential connections. These features put me in a unique position to avoid a variety of objections and worries associated with Fumerton’s more demanding theory.
In my 8th and final chapter I show how my developed theory avoids easy justification without falling into global skepticism. On my account, a subject S only possesses perceptual evidence for beliefs about the physical world if S “grasps” its relevance to these beliefs. This “grasp”, however, is a non-conceptual form of awareness (i.e. direct acquaintance) which is weaker than justified belief. This allows me to avoid the skeptical regress. Moreover, I argue that the “grasp” of the relevance of one’s perceptual evidence just is to be aware of an a priori reason for believing that one’s perceptual evidence is reliable. This, thereby, allows us to avoid the illegitimate gains in justification involved in easy justification. Given how grim the prospects are for resolving our puzzle by other means (the upshot of my third chapter), my theory’s ability to resolve our puzzle gives reason to think that epistemic theories founded on a traditional notion of direct acquaintance should be given more serious consideration than they have been given by contemporary epistemologists.