Current Research in Epistemology
My first research projects focused on updating and developing an internalist theory of justification founded on acquaintance. Contemporary epistemologists are quick to dismiss acquaintance theories in favor of more naturalistically acceptable externalist theories such as reliabilism, or in favor of less demanding internalist theories such as phenomenal conservatism. My research shows that these dismissals are too quick. First, my work aims to 'demystify' the nature of the acquaintance by advocating an account of acquaintance that grounds it in our ability for selective attention. Second, my work aims to weaken the demands of an acquaintance theory so as to avoid over-intellectualizing justification while still respecting internalist motivations.
My paper “Is Justification Easy or Impossible?”(2015) in Synthese develops one aspect of this project by showing that an appeal to an acquaintance relation helps to resolve problems surrounding bootstrapping. My forthcoming paper on acquaintance for the Blackwell Companion to Epistemology 3rd Edition provides an overview of the nature of the acquaintance relation, disagreements about the objects of acquaintance, views on the epistemic significance of acquaintance, and several objections and replies to epistemic theories that appeal to acquaintance. Lastly, another paper in its final stages attempts to develop and defend a substantive metaphysics of acquaintance in terms of attention and shows how this account provides additional tools for avoiding common worries for acquaintance epistemologies.
Another aspect of my overall project argues that appealing to acquaintance allows for a more satisfactory internalism. My paper "What Seemings Seem to Be" (2015) in Episteme is loosely connected to this project. That paper aims to show that there are good reasons to identify 'seemings' with conscious inclinations to form belief, and the traditional arguments against making such an identification are unpersuasive. While that paper is focuses on the nature of 'seemings', my analysis has important implications for the plausibility of epistemic principles such as Phenomenal Conservatism (PC). I'm currently working on papers that more explicitly discuss the advantages of my version of the acquaintance theory compared to phenomenal conservatism, other acquaintance theories that appeal to the structure of phenomenal concepts, and Declan Smithies' recent powerful defense of phenomenal mentalism. However, I also aim to show that each of these theories has critical insights that can be incorporated into an acquaintance epistemology once we've properly understood the unique epistemic role that acquaintance plays.
Lastly, I am also interested in epistemological work with a much more social focus. I'm currently working on various issues related to connections between echo chambers, AI bias, and epistemic injustice. This recent work is attempting to illustrate the potential for a vicious feedback cycle that may occur between epistemic injustice, echo chambers, and AI bias where each element continually feeds into and reinforces/magnifies the others.
My paper “Is Justification Easy or Impossible?”(2015) in Synthese develops one aspect of this project by showing that an appeal to an acquaintance relation helps to resolve problems surrounding bootstrapping. My forthcoming paper on acquaintance for the Blackwell Companion to Epistemology 3rd Edition provides an overview of the nature of the acquaintance relation, disagreements about the objects of acquaintance, views on the epistemic significance of acquaintance, and several objections and replies to epistemic theories that appeal to acquaintance. Lastly, another paper in its final stages attempts to develop and defend a substantive metaphysics of acquaintance in terms of attention and shows how this account provides additional tools for avoiding common worries for acquaintance epistemologies.
Another aspect of my overall project argues that appealing to acquaintance allows for a more satisfactory internalism. My paper "What Seemings Seem to Be" (2015) in Episteme is loosely connected to this project. That paper aims to show that there are good reasons to identify 'seemings' with conscious inclinations to form belief, and the traditional arguments against making such an identification are unpersuasive. While that paper is focuses on the nature of 'seemings', my analysis has important implications for the plausibility of epistemic principles such as Phenomenal Conservatism (PC). I'm currently working on papers that more explicitly discuss the advantages of my version of the acquaintance theory compared to phenomenal conservatism, other acquaintance theories that appeal to the structure of phenomenal concepts, and Declan Smithies' recent powerful defense of phenomenal mentalism. However, I also aim to show that each of these theories has critical insights that can be incorporated into an acquaintance epistemology once we've properly understood the unique epistemic role that acquaintance plays.
Lastly, I am also interested in epistemological work with a much more social focus. I'm currently working on various issues related to connections between echo chambers, AI bias, and epistemic injustice. This recent work is attempting to illustrate the potential for a vicious feedback cycle that may occur between epistemic injustice, echo chambers, and AI bias where each element continually feeds into and reinforces/magnifies the others.
